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Chairman, CGIAR 
1818 H Street, N.W. 
Washington D.C. 20433 
U.S.A. 
Dear Mr. Baum, 
August 31, 1982 
At the request of CGIAR members, the Technical Advisory 
Committee had under review since 1980 the implications of plant 
breeders' rights schemes for the work of the Centres. TAC had 
a first discussion on,the subject with the Directors of the Centres 
concerned at its 24th meeting in Lima (Peru), A study was then 
commissioned by TAC to three consultants, Drs. M. Heuver, J.J. Hardon 
and K.A, Fikkert. The consultants had extensive discussions with the 
Committee, the Directors of the Centres and other appropriate sources 
of expertise and parties concerned. Their report was presented to 
a TAC Workshop which was held from 26-28 January 1982 at FAO 
Headquarters, Rome, under the chairmanship of Dr. D.F.R. Bommer, 
Assistant Director-General, Agriculture Department of FAO. Both 
representatives of the Centres and experts from developed and develop- 
ing countries participated in the Workshop. The report of the 
consultants and the conclusions of the Workshop then served as a basis 
for TAC in the development of a proposal for a statement of principles 
on the subject. The proposal was reviewed and endorsed by the Centre 
Directors at their joint meeting with TAC last June. 
The task was not an easy one and could not have been fulfilled 
without very constructive cooperation extended to TAC by all the 
diverse parties concerned. I wish to highlight in particular the 
quality of the report of the consultants, their objectivity and 
thoroughness in addressing this complex subject. TAC received 
considerable assistance from FAO and many other individual experts 
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in this undertaking. The financial support of the Netherlands Government 
is also gratefully acknowledged; Finally, during this long process TAC 
greatly benefitted from the many contributions, advices and comments 
from the Centres, including IBPGR, at the successive stages of the 
elaboration of the documents. Their collaboration has been most helpful 
au,: e.1 - -7. LIILVU~II *& i 5 &ic;-c;;c, 1 I-,-, -L-t ,‘"fL L‘lUL ; ;;.Cf; .$br Yy.*-J~Ys+-~i~i-? ?f +fT. b "- ---- 
issue has been gained both within the CGIAR system and outside. 
I have pleasure in submitting for the consideration of the Group 
the proposed Statement on Plant Breeders' Rights and the IARCs, together 
with the supporting documentation which includes the consuitants' report 
and the summary of the conclusions and recommendations of the Workshop. 
TAC recommends that this statement be endorsed by the Group and serve as 
general guidelines for the Centres in dealing with this question in the 
future. : 
Yours sincerely, 
Chairman, TAC 
AGD/TAC:IAR/82/23 
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TAC STATEMENT ON 
PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS AND THE IARCs 
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August 1982 
TAC STATEMENT ON 
PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS AND THE IARCs 
1. TAC generally endorses the report of the consultants .?L' 
Drs. J. Hardon, M. Beuver and K. rikkert and the conclusions and 
recommendations of the TAC Workshop on Plant Breeders' Rights and 
the IARCs 21. 'The Committee commends these reports for careful 
study by the members of the CGIAR and the institutions supported 
by the Group. TAC considers that these documents will contribute 
substantially to a clarification of the issues and should dispel 
some misunderstandings and unjustified concerns regarding plant 
breeders' rights (PBR) in relation to the objectives and the work 
of the CGIAR. The documents also recommend some concrete action 
which could help to avoid certain risks and problems in the 
relations between the IARCs and their cooperators, and their 
overall involvement in pursuing the objectives of the CGIAR in 
support of agricultural research in developing countries. TAC 
generally agrees with the reconunendations and actions proposed 
in these reportsand wishes to draw the attention o$ the CGIAR 
and of the IARCs to the most important foZZoting points. 
2. As part of their breeding activities and their cooperation 
with national programmes, the IARCs distribute a wide range of 
genetic material (germplasm, segregating material, semi-finished 
and finished varieties). Some of this material originates from 
the breeding program&es of the IARCs, other materials come from 
national programmes cooperating with the Centres and enter their 
cooperative'networks for further testing and improvement. The 
IARCs have an open-door policy as regards the access and use of 
this material by their cooperators. The IARCs make their material 
available preferentially to the public sector in developing 
countries (government breeding programmes). They also provide 
material to the private sector in developing and developed countries 
on request. TAC approves of this open-door policy and considers it 
a key element in the fuller utilization of genetic resources for 
the improvement of agriculture in developing countries. TAC also 
fully supports the policy of the IARCs by which they do not wish 
to seek exclusive rights on the improved genetic material which 
they produce through their breeding programmes. 
l/ AGD/TAC:IAR/81/25 Rev. 1 
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3. As regards the diverse'materials originating from the IARCs or 
entering their international cooperative networks, the existing 
legislations and procedures for granting PBR are elaborated in such 
a way that the risk of misappropriation of this material by private 
interests is essentially confined to semi-tlnlshed varleties. 'this 
risk and related problems associated with PER can be avoided by the 
following actions: 
(4 The IARCs should establish full descriptions of these semi- 
finished varieties which they distribute,and widely publicize 
this information, making it available to the national offices 
granting plant varieties certificates. This information 
should be supplemented by the provision of small samples of 
seeds to some of these offices as references for control. 
(b) The national offices which grant plant varieties' certificates 
and breeders' rights should, in consultation with the IARCs, 
elaborate their regulations and procedures so as to prevent 
such misappropriation and utilize the information and seed 
samples provided by the IARCs to this effect. 
(4 The IARCs should review the contracts of employment of their 
own personnel to prevent that their breeders may seek 
exclusive rights on the improved material which they develop 
as an integral part of the IARC programmes. 
4. There is no evidence available as to whether or not PBR 
legislations would affect the freedom of movement of genetic material 
among developing countries or between these countries and the IARCs. 
TAC notes, however, the concerns and fears'expressed in this respect 
by several of the participants in its Workshop on IARCs and PBR and 
agrees that, if such restrictions should occur as a result of the 
growing economic competition and conflicts of interests, they could 
seriously hamper further progress in crop improvement in developing 
countries and the key role played by the IARCs in this field. The 
Committee notes that the reports of the consultants and of the 
Workshop concur in considering that the establishment of an appropriate 
infrastructure for seed production, seed legislation and variety 
control are essential pre-requisites for the successful introduction 
of PBR. It notes, however, that a wide range of technical, socio- 
economic and political considerations may influence the decision of 
a government to introduce PBR in its seed legislation. TAC, therefore, 
does not consider it appropriate to make recommendations as to the 
introduction of PBR in developing countries. These matters should 
be left to the governments concerned. TAC merely wishes to draw 
attention to several useful observations made in this regard by the - 
consultants and the participants in the Workshop. - 
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5. Independently from the decision by a developing country whether 
or not to adopt PBR, it is essential that the IARCs include in their 
cooperative agreements with national programmes appropriate provisions 
and conditions under which a party can seek and obtain exclusive 
-r.TPn rights on varieties Origi,;iktlili; from 4~~ -Lti. p,ifs;-c;i,~ cs :,-*:crcl LAIrL-rr 
to the recommendations of the TAC Workshop in this respect, namely 
that when the government of a country cooperating with an IARC grants 
such exclusive rights, the rights sho'uld be confined to the territory 
of that country. 
6. TAC also recommends that the IARCs should establish criteria 
and procedures for their cooperation with private companies and 
formulate, after consultation with the national authorities concerned, 
similar conditions and agreements regarding private companies which 
seek access to the material of the IARCs. Moreover, the principles 
embodied in such agreements with special reference to PRR should be 
further elaborated jointly by the IARCs so as to constitute a code 
of ethics on relationships with their cooperators. 
7. The risk of genetic erosion was considered by TAC as a separate 
issue from that of PBR. The high degree of uniformity achieved in 
modern varieties and the replacement of older cultivars by fewer but 
more successful varieties on wider areas are some of the major causes 
of potential risk of genetic erosion l/ and this independently from 
the adoption of PBR legislation or not. This risk can be prevented 
by appropriate measures for the establishment, conservation, evaluation 
and use of genetic resource collections both at national and inter- 
national level. TAC concurs with the conclusions of the consultants, 
of the participants of the Workshop and of IBPGR in this regard. 
Nevertheless the extension of PBR legislation may contribute indirectly 
to genetic erosion.. Although no evidence is available so far to 
substantiate this concern, TAC suggests that this risk should be 
monitored. TAC also notes that the compliance with DUS 2/ standards - 
in variety control, seed inspection are necessary for consumer 
protection and is imposed independently from the existence or not of 
plant breeders' rights provisions in national seed legislations. The 
concern which has been expressed with regard to DUS standards and the 
use of catalogues of registered varieties, again, are not directly 
related to PBR but raise broader questions related to breeding 
l/ Other causes are for example deforestation, land clearing, over- - 
grazing, new human settlements and more generally changes in land 
use. 
21 DUS = Distinctness, Uniformity, Stability. 
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strategies and maintenance of genetic diversity in the present and 
future conditions of agriculture. The IARCs are conscious of the 
importance of these problems and make continuous efforts to broaden 
the diversity of the improved material which they produce. 
8. Having assessed the actual problems and risks associated with 
PBR as regards the IARCs and their cooperators, TAC concludes that 
some of the problems and risks indicated in (3) and (4) above, should 
not be underestimated by the IARCs and the Centres should actively 
seek appropriate agreements and other cooperative arrangements as 
reconnnended above. TAC notes, however, that these additional 
measures will place an additional burden on the management and staff 
of the Centres and involve some additional costs in particular for 
the preparation and dissemination of the information required and 
the provision of reference seed samples. It will also require on 
the part of the cooperators of the IARCs an active collaboration in 
the prevention of problems which could otherwise adversely affect 
one of the major achievements of the CGIAR system - namely the wide- 
scale exchange and use of germplasm for the improvement of agriculture 
in developing countries. 
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TAC WORKSHOP OK PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS AND THE IARCs 
(FAO, Rome, 26 - 28 January 1982) 
._ \ 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .&+- 
General Considerations on Plant Breeding. Seed Production and PBR 
1. Plant breeding and seed production usually involve a complex system 
of activities in the public and private sectors including the establish- 
ment of collections and screening of genetic resources, their use through 
diverse breeding methods which themselves include a number of steps in the 
development, selection and stabilization of improved genetic material, the 
testing and evaluation of the varieties, their multiplication and - 
distribution-under the control of some mechanisms for the observance of 
quality standards and the protection of the consumers and producers. The 
development of such complex systems of activities and their efficient 
functioning are of. vital importance to agriculture and the whole national 
economy both in developed and developing countries. The governments have, 
therefore, taken measures to promote and regulate these developments at 
national level by the establishment of appropriate institutions and 
legislation. In some developed countries, provisions for the protection 
of plant breeders' rights have been added to the seed legislation. These 
additions were made after a long process of development of the national 
plant breeding and seed production systems and the establishment of an 
adequate infrastructure for regulatory controls and legislation enforcement. 
Some developing countries have already established national legislation 
and infrastructures for plant breeding and seed production involving 
public institutions but often to a lesser degree the private sector. 
2. Even when the'breeding of varieties, as well as seed production and 
distribution are in the hands of the government, there is need for a 
separate mechanism for testing and for enforcement of quality control. 
This need not necessarily take the form of seed legislation or PBR. Plant 
breeders' rights aim at stimulating long-term investments in plant breeding 
especially in the cooperative and private sectors. Plant breeders' rights 
should rather be regarded as a possible addition to an already well 
organized seed production and distribution system. The introduction of PBR 
is a national decision, however, and the PBR scheme should be adjusted to 
national needs. It should be noted in this regard that a plant breeders' 
right is a nationally limited right. Nevertheless, a breeder may apply for 
protection in several countries. 
c 
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3. A plant breeders' right compatible to the UPOV Convention relates 
to a plant variety as such, so to a specific combination of characteristics, 
not to individual characters which may be embedded in the variety. 
According to the UPOV Convention the legal right covers the production 
C^, _____^ "_ ,I ,---..,-I-, ---r--&I-- :I-, -Jzc-.-! . . A"& fVLy""'- "A. C"uYLlCLCLu* YLcI~I~LL&LI~, "ALCLALLE) :;I Sal, cuid iue luQihci~- 
ing of propagating material as such. In general, it does not cover the 
production of propagating material for its use on one's own premises nor 
can it ccver the use of that material by another breeder in creating 
another variety, except when the repeated use of the protected variety is 
necessary for the commercial production of that other variety. 
4. Some developing countries already have seed legislations which, 
in some cases, include the possibility of granting some form of incentive 
and/or protection to the breeders and/or to the psoducers of seeds. 
Examples were given of systems which function already for many years 
without PBR but with a series of control mechanisms. In some of these 
countries, however, private breeders would hope to see PBR schemes 
established. 
5. Among the developed countries which have plant breeders' rights 
and are members of the UPOV Convention, there is still a considerable 
diversity in the relative roles of the public and private sectors in 
breeding and seed production, although some common principles have been 
developed regarding the standards which the varieties should meet before 
release (D.U.S.). l-/ In developing countries, the role of the public 
sector is usually more important in the breeding and seed production 
activities, and the relative importance of the DTJS.standards.may vary. 
The performance of the material, and the possibility of sp.reading quickly 
HYVs 2/ among farmers are often considered more important than the 
observance of the DUS standards. 
6. The decision by a country to adopt a certain type of PBR legis- 
lation does not only depend on the above technical considerations. It is 
a political decision regarding the respective roles of the public and 
private sectors and the sharing of the costs and benefits of plant 
breeding and seed production activities among diverse categories.of 
I'interested parties". The fiscal system of the country also plays a 
role in particular, as regards the beneficiaries of the revenues from PBR. 
L/ D.U.S. = Distinctness, Uniformity, Stability. 
2/ m = High Yielding Varieties. a - 
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The- Role of the IA&s in Plant Breeding, Movement of Genetic 
Material and Release of Varieties 
7. The work of the CGIAR system collectively represents a very large 
international plant breeding programme in the public sector - possibly 
the largest in the world. The practice of the. institutions of the CGIAR . 
is to assemble germplasm and produce improved materials of all kinds 
(segregating material, semi-finished and finished varieties) available 
free of charge to national organizations concerned with agricultural 
development. The IARCs make their material available to the public sector 
preferentially in developing countries (government breeding programmes). 
They also provide material to the private sector in developing and 
developed countries on request. 
8. The only level at which PBR could be awarded is at the level of 
the individual nation; an IARC could, therefore, if it wishes, seek to 
obtain PBR at country level. This, however, would apply only to finished 
varieties, whereas increasingly the IARCs distribute segregating material 
and semi-finished varieties for use in the national programmes. 
Considering their international mandate and their objectives in raising 
food production in developing countries (in particular in strengthening 
national breeding capacities for the benefit of the small farmer), the 
IARCs have not felt it necessary nor desirable to apply for PBR on the 
finished materials which they produce. 
9. The major risk of appropriation of the IARCs material by third 
parties for commercial profit is essentially limited to the semi-finished 
varieties which the Centres distribute. The existing legislation on PBR 
in UPOV member countries does not allow the granting of a right with 
respect to segregating material nor to a finished variety which was not 
bred by the applicant, unless the applicant is the successor in title of 
the breeder. It is essential, however, that the IARCs publicize more 
widely the information on the semi-finished and finished varieties which 
enter their international distribution networks, including the related 
data for the identification, characterization and evaluation of this 
material. The IARCs should provide this information not only to their 
cooperators as at present, but also to the offices issuing plant variety 
certificates in the countries which have PBR legislation. This will 
help those offices to prevent misappropriation of the IARC material, in 
particular by ensuring that an applicant for protection of a variety can 
legitimately be considered as the breeder or as otherwise entitled to 
apply for protection. The countries concerned might also wish to 
elaborate their administrative procedures further, in the light of the 
possibility of such misappropriation. 
10. The IARCs have an open-door policy as regards germplasm exchange 
and use of the improved genetic material, which is developed through 
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their breeding programmes and international cooperative trials. Varieties 
created as a result of this cooperation may be released in different 
countries. Although the IARCs would normally be considered as the 
breeders or co-breeders of these varieties, they do not wish to seek any 
exclusive rights over them, the IARCs' objectives being to promote the 
widest use of this imnroved material for the benefit of all develoning 
P mtnfr; e-5. _ "I..-.. . However , a party which had cooperated with an IARC and 
developed the finished variety in a particular country, on the basis of 
semi-finished material originating from an IARC, may wish to seek some 
kind of exclusive rights as regards the use of the variety for seed 
production,and the Government of this country may -wish to grant such 
rights. The participants to the Workshop recommended that, in this case, 
the granting of any rights on this variety should be confined to the 
territory of the country of the party referred to: in the view of the 
participants, the latter party should not have the right to apply for 
protection of the variety in another country. . 
11. It is also recommended that the IARCs jointly develop, with the 
help of TAC, a code of ethics regarding the use of their material and 
their cooperation with other breeders and seed producers and that such 
principles be embodied in the memoranda of agreement which the Centres 
establish with their cooperators, both in the public and private sectors. 
12. The IARCs, along with other public and private breeding institutions - 
in developed and developing countries, are involved in a considerable - 
movement of breeding material on a worldwide scale. The participants 
to the Workshop noted that the movement of breeding material among 
developing countries is considerable and perhaps much wider than that among 
breeding institutions which now exchange material, in the developed world. 
This movement is vital to the development of improved genetic material 
.for the developing countries (from where most of the genetic diversity 
originates). Since PBR do not exist in the developing world at this 
stage, there is no evidence that would suggest that the movement of 
germplasm among developing countries would be affected by the introduction 
of PBR in these countries. However, considerable fear was expressed in 
this regard, especially for the free movement of semi-finished varieties. 
In the developed countries, there are long-established cooperative 
informal and formal arrangements among breeders, in the private and 
public sectors. These arrangements contribute to the movement of germplasm 
at a much earlier stage among the participants in such arrangements. 
Nevertheless concerns were expressed as parties which may have had only 
very limited involvement in the development of new varieties may, 
prematurely, gain unauthorized possession of materials in advanced stages 
of development and testing and apply for and obtain exclusive rights to 
them. These concerns may place serious limitations on the willingness 
of plant breeders to exchange and expose their promising lines in wider A 
scale testing, nationally or internationally. v 
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Plant Breeders' Rights and Developing Countries 
13. The consensus of the Workshop was that the main priority in 
many developing countries in this field was the strengthening of their 
plant breeding and seed production capacities, including the related 
aspects of seed legislation. It was indicated that seed legislation 
may include provisions to protect interests of breeaers of new varieties 
and stimulate selectively their activities, It was noted that several 
countries were taking a very cautious attitude with respect to PBR as 
long as their major infrastructure requirements and other regulatory 
controls were not established. The adoption of PBR may be considered 
desirable when these requirements have been met. It is also essential 
that, before PBR are introduced, the existing varieties in the country 
be duly identified, and characterized and that the seed enterprises of 
the country be strengthened and protected against unfair competition and 
the risk of unwanted L/ monopolies being established within the country 
by stronger national or foreign companies. Nevertheless, in the final 
analysis, the decision of enacting PBR legislation depends on the 
possibility of its effective implementation and on political considerations 
regarding the diverse categories of people concerned, the public opinion 
and the overall policy and economic system of the country. In addition, 
some technical considerations are important as regards the criteria and 
standards for the release of varieties as indicated in the.section on 
- "General Considerations" above. 
- 
PBR and Genetic Resources Conservation. 
14. The Workshop generally endorsed the views of the IBPGR and of the 
TAC Consultants in this respect, namely that there was no evidence that 
PSR would hamper the work of IBPGR and IARCs in plant genetic resource 
conservation and accelerate genetic erosion. The activities of IBPGR 
and the IARCs in developing and maintaining world collections were strongly 
supported; Moreover‘ and independently from the consideration of the 
implications of PBR, concern was expressed during the Workshop about the 
lack of appropriate legal provisions for the maintenance and free access 
to the important germplasm collections. 
Follo;~-up Action 
15. The Workshop recommended that the report of the Consultants be 
submitted to TAC with the observations, suggestions and recommendations 
presented above. The participants expressed appreciation to TAC and FAO, 
the Consultants in particular, for the clarification which this initiative 
had brought on this subject, where some misunderstanding had developed. 
l/ Note by the Secretariat: Some countries have established state 
monopolies on seed production. 
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Dr. Ralph W. Cummings 
Chairman 
Technical Advisory Committee to the CGIAP. 
812 Rosemont Avenue 
Raleigh, North Carolina 276G7 
USA 
Dear Dr. Cummings 
I am pleased to submit herewith a discussion paper on Plant Breeders' Rights 
and International Agricultural Research Centres of the CGIAR as-requested by 
the Technical Advisory Committee. 
This study was conducted by Ir. M. Heuver (Director of the Research Station 
- for Arable Farming and Field Production of Vegetables: chairman of the Board 
for Plant Breeders' Rights in the Netherlands), Dr. J.Y. Hardon (Directorate 
of Agricultural Reserach) and Mr. K-A, Fikkert (legal-department, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries).- maii< inputs ueme made by :I%-; a.?ccs tid 
Ir. R. Duyvendak (both of the Government Institute for Research on Varieties 
of Cultivated Plants). Helpful suggestions were also made by various officials 
of FAO, Centre Directors, Metiers of the CINEYT-Staff, officials of the ?kant 
Variety Protection Office in Washington and others. 
The three main consultantsparticipated in this activity in a personal capacity. 
Hence the views expressed are their own. They found the subject both interesting 
and very complex. Many different points of views were encountered while discus- 
sing P.B.R. 'with various people, ranging from concerned members of the public, 
government officials to representatives of private industry. An attempt was 
made to give a fair coverage of various issues. 
. 
The objective of this paper is not to give answers, but to provide information 
and &ad& issues f&r a workshop to be or&&eh-by the TAC. 
I Ropefully it provides a useful analysis of the current situation. 
Respectfully submitted 
(Jaap J. Hardon) 
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CHAPTEZ I - IhTRODUCTION - 
1.1. This report is addressed to the Technical idVd!iOq Committee (TAC) of the 
.-- 
Consultative Group on International AgricrlEkal Research (CGIAR). It has 
been prepared by some people in the Netherlands involved in variety testing 
and p&t variety protection in consultation with appropriate sources of 
expertise and parties concerned, in particular during a joint meeting of 
TAC and Centre Directors (Ibadan, June 1981) (See report of the 26th TAC 
meeting AGD/TAC:IAR/81/129 paras 258-267. TX Secretariat FAO Rome, 
____ _---_-I_-- 
August 1981) and additional discussions with Cimmyt, Mexico, the Plant 
Varfety Protection Office, Washingtoqand the Plant Production and 
Protection Division and The Legal Office of the FAO. 
It is a discussion paper presenting the findings of the above mentioned 
consultancy group on Plant Breeders' Rights and the implications for the 
plant breeding activities and breeders' stock release of the International 
Centres. 
It is not a review of P.B.R.-legislation or a study on the legal provisions 
and proc&ral' steps involved in plant variety protection in various 
countries i 
1.2. The tens of reference were as follows : 
With the general guidance of TAC and its Secretariat, and in consultation 
with appropriate sources of expertise and parties concerned : 
a) - 
b) - 
cl - 
to review the draft list of issues prepared by TAC as regards 
P.B.R. and their implications for genetic resources, IARC's 
and developing countries, and to indentify those issues which 
deserve special attention by TAC, the CGIAR and the IARC'a; 
to examine relevant aspects bearing on these issues, as 
related to both UPOV and USA type schemes, their advantages 
and disadvantages; 
to assess the probable long-term effects of the introduction 
of P.B.R.-legislation by developtig countries on the role, 
activities, poTicies and need for IARC's; 
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1.3. 
1.4. 
1.5. 
- 
d) - to prepare a discussion paper presenting the findings of the V 
consultant's analysis on the above three points and outlining 
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with alternatives as reqi;ired, for review by a working group 
representative of the main parties concerned. 
Annexe l‘provides a draft list of issues on P.B.R. r&mitted by TAC for 
consideration to the consultants. 
NO attempt is made to directly participate in the current debate in how 
far P.B.R. .effects the rate of genetic erosions and contrihtes to a concen- 
tiiitionof plant breeding in multinational corporations (See amongst others 
the book *Seeds of the Barth: a private or public resource' by P. Mooney 
1979). The authors recognize that these aspects are part of a complex but 
do not recognize a simple cause and effect relationship. 
The aim is on providinq objective information on P.B.R. in order to stimulate 
constructive discussion, with emphasis ,on the effects P.B.R. may have on U'te- 
IARC's and on plant breeding in developing countries. .--.. - _ 
. 7 
The.issues related to P.B.R. and genetic erosion and the effect of P.B.R. 
on genetic resources have already been addressed by an IBPGR-consultant 
(See report by Prof. E. &erg: The Relationship between Plant breeding, 
Germplasm collection and Plant Breeders' Rights. AGP:IBPGR:81/16, IBPGR 
Secretariat, Rome, January 1981). In the report it is stated that: 
'The dangers of genetic erosion need to be taken seriously. Certainly 
'advanced plant breeding is substantially directed towards special goals. 
"Therefore breeding lines of little interest to development towards such 
' "goals may be neglected. But this is no more serious after Plant Breeders' 
"Rights were introduced than before when commercial interests also played 
"an important role'in the establishment of plant breeding goals. The serious 
'ness of genetic erosion is therefore really not a question of great L. 
'interest to the discussion on Plant Breeders' Rights. It is rather a 
"question of concern for breeders and genebank specialists regarding the 
- 
"possibilities of finding ways of avoiding erosion. Breeding lines in 
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"danger of being lost because they are of no immediate interest to the 
"breeders should - om the basis of the breeders' judgement - be turned 
"over to a genebank. It must be the genebank's obligation to register, 
"evalluate, describe them and keep them alive," 
.__ .- 
Outline of the report 
1.6. After the introduction in chapter I, various aspects of P.B.R. are reviewed 
in chapter 11. Special attention is given .to the recognizability of Varieties 
(Distinctness criteria), variety tests and the legal framework. P.B.R. and 
its administration in both Western Europe and the USA are dealt k?ith in 
some detail, The UPOV-convention is discussed with special emphasis on *se 
aspects that effect use and distribution of varieties. 
In chapter III are discussed the various implications P-B-R. may have on 
IARC’S. 
In chapter IV issues raised by TAC are discussed, more or less in summary 
based on chapters 11 and III. 
The report ends with a sunnmry and co.rdusion. 
czAPTERII- PLANT BREEDING, SEED TRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION AND B 
POSSIBLE LEGISLATION 
Plant varieties and their recoanition 
71 -.e_. El*rr.‘, beeding and its products - *roved plant varieties - are essential 
components of modem agriculture and agricultural developments. Plant 
breeding makes use of available genetic variability to "create" varieties 
which are superior to the original material in certain identified character- 
istics (yield, disease resistance, quality, specific adaptation, etc.). 
. 
2.2. Modern varieties are generally genetically more uniform than traditional 
varieties. Hence whereas in traditional planting material considerable 
genetic variation may be stored within populations or land races, in modern 
varieties this depends largely on variation between varieties. Rence in 
modern agriculture loss of genetic variability can he compensated for by 
growing a greater number of varieties. Such varieties should of course be - 
. 
of diverse genetic origin. In many situations this is however largely ar, - 
academic possibility since in practice often one or only a few varieties 
are adopted by farmers in a region. Furthermore the genetic background 
of different varieties is often narrow. Hence it is realistic to assume 
that many replacements 0 f traditional varieties by modern varieties carry 
the danger of loss of genetic variation. The dangers of genetic loss are 
magnified when replacement takes place in centres of diversity of the crop. 
Tnis situation is rare in developed countries, 
Third World where most centres of diversity of 
are located. 
but much more common in the 
agricultural crop species 
Hence before any introduction on a large scale of (new) varieties is 
considered, adequate measures should be taken to preserve the original 
genetic variation in some form. The assumption is that plant breeding is an 
inevitable part of agriculture development and measures against the intro- 
duction of modern varieties are not a realistic alternative. 
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2.3. Before new varieties are introduced, extensive tests should be carried 
out to establish the relative merits of new varieties in comparison with 
the previous materiaL Once suitable varieties are identified, seed has 
to be produced for distribution to farmers. Usually farmers Lave a chcicc 
out of a range of varieties. 
In countries with a diverse topography, latitude and or climate, extension 
services usually conduct regional variety trials to allow farmers to make * 
a choice of varieties, best suited to their conditions. The freedom of 
choice increases when the varieties offered are more diverse and the 
farmers become more selective. 
To allow variety control and seed inspection, measures are generally 
considered necessary to guarantee type and quality to some objective 
criteria. The ability to identify varieties is essential in applying these 
measures. 
Where plant breeding, seed production and seed distribution are carried 
out by government organizations there still needs to be a separate mecha- 
nism for testing and assurance and enforcements of quality control standards. 
However as soon as private enterprise participates ti any part of the 
process, especially in the marketing of varieties, legislation-on recog- 
nizability of varieties and on the standards the seed must meet, becomes 
essential to allow adequate controls for consumer protection. In the book 
"Successful Seed Programs: A Planning and Management Guide" (ed. John E. 
Douglas) several alternative organizational models are discussed and 
summarized on page 91 as follows : 
2.4. "1. - Private seed enterprises that have their own research programs and 
.I total control of all seed multiplication and marketing functions. 
“2 . - Private seed enterprises that receive partial assistance from govern- 
90 ment - such as publicly bred varieties, seed stocks for further 
II multiplication, special credit concessions and subsidies - without 
I, government interference in pricing. 
“3 * - Private seed enterprises and seed production activities that get 
VI maximum government assistance iuch as equipment and building leases 
,; :-- . . ..: 
, 
” and lease-purchase arrangements, special uses of government staffs, - 
9, marketing help, and measures to stimulate "seed multipliers". 
"4 . - Joint seed enterprises which involve both private and public capital. 
"5 . - Government seed enterprises and seed activities that have only govern- 
meet participation in all or parts of the seed production and marketing 
8, programs." 
The technical and legislative nature of 
determined by the way the seed industry 
the control mechanisms are largely 
is orgatlized. 
Seed legislation 
--_ .- 
2.5. If a government decides to involve the private sector in seed production 
and distribution, it is appropriate to lay down legal standards regarding 
the quality of the seed, including the inspection of the seed production 
and the seed Itself. 
In "Seed Legislation" (legislation study no. 16 of the Food and Agriculture- .- - 
Organization of the United Nations) several examples of seed legislation 
are given. 
Legislation or regulations concerning the acceptance of varieties should be : 
enacted ir, order to determine the characteristics of the varieties. Wnether 
bred by public or private breeders, tiat knowledge is also of great 
importance to extension services and for seed control. _. --_ 
2.6. Legislation on seed control and'the admittance of (recommended) varieties 
function independently from a Plant Breeders' Rights-scheme. Seed control 
mechanisms are essentially established for consumer protection. Lists 
of recommended varieties are useful for agricultural extension. The farmer, 
when given a choice between different varieties, requires reliable 
information on what are the most suitable varieties for his conditions. 
When he buys seed of a particular variety, he wants to be confident that 
he gets the variety he asked for, that the seed is of good physical 
purity and satisfies certain standards of germination capacity. This, - 
in the developed countries, has led to systems of variety testing leading - .-. - - - _ - __. ___ _ . -. . . . . . _ ___ . ,_ i.__ _.. _ __ 
.- 
-?- 
up to national or regional lists of (recm ded) varieties and- seed 
certification. 
~ _ . - 
2.7. The European Economic communiry system is given as an example. Within the 
European Economic Community member-states are req;lired to establish 
national lists of varieties of agricultural crops whereby acceptance 
depends both on satisfyhng the standards of distinction, unYfonnity 
- .-.-_ 
ana stability -(the 
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
so-called--‘DGS' standards), 
.,__ -_ 
as weli & on meeting tests 
on agricultural value and use (including yield , resistance to pests and 
diseases, quality etc.). 
For horticultural'crops value tests are not a condition for inclusion on 
the national variety list. 
FUrthermore, the genetic (and morphological) composure of the varieties must 
be maintained. Xn other words, an accepted variety must be kept within 
its original description, which was made in connection with the acceptance. 
2.8. As long as a variety is on the natfonallist of an EEC cowtry, propagating 
material of that variety as such can be produced , certified and marketed. 
Since for all crops some kind of certification is mandatory and since for 
most crops-only certification of propagating material which is true to 
variety is permitted, acceptance of the variety is a prerequisite for 
seed production and distribution in an EEC member-state. 
After a certain period a variety, which has been accepted at the national 
level, is automatically included in the EEC variety list. The effect of 
the inclusion is that seed of that variety can be traded freely in all 
EEC countries. 
2.9. Although the national and EEX variety lists are called sometimes "restricted 
lists"I the EEfZ list includes more than 1.108 cereal. varieties and during 
the past 4 years over 50 varieties were added yearly. 
For potatoes there are over 300 varieties on the common list. Bowever, it 
cannot be denied that the system, reflecting the requLremen~ts of agriculture 
in Western Europe, gives no or little opportunity for the inclusion of 
traditional varieties and land races; as these generally do not satisfy DUS 
standards. 
2.10. Whereas seed legislation providesthe legal framework for the acceptance 
of varieties and the trade of their seeds. actual control: is generalLy 
enforced through Seed Certification Schemes. 
2.11. Major aspects of Seed Certification Schemes are : 
a) - 
5) - 
c) -’ 
2.12. Generally plant breeders or plant breeding departments/divisions are 
Regulations controling the labeling and movement of the seed of 
established varieties or populations. 
Standard systems to check on variety identity and purity by field 
inspection and laboratory tests. . 
A legally identified person or institution responsible for 
maintaining the variety in its described form. 
responsible for maintaining a basic stock of seed of their varieties 
satisfying DUS standards (Breeders' seed). Breeders' seed is multiplied - 
to pre-basic seed and generally handed over to other organizations responsible_ 
for further multiplication. Pre-basic seed is multiplied'to basic seed from 
which seeds will be produced that is distributed to farmers. The latter, 
under the OECD rules (perhaps characteristically.te most elaborate), are 
generally referred to as "certified seeds". Depending on the multiplicaticn 
rate of the species, each step may consist of one or more generations. 
2.13. Critical steps in the process a.re multiplication from pre-basic seed 
(responsibility of the plant breeder) to basic seed (responsibility of the 
dfstributor) and of course the production of material offered for sale to _--. .-- - - 
farmers. Tests can be done in the field (habitus, varietal characteristics, 
standard of production, weeds etc.), on trial fields (comparing a sample 
with a standard sample of the original breiders' seed) and in the labora- 
tory (purity, germination, etc.). Usually various tests are carried out ' 
wi& growing emphaaio on tsst8 in trial fields aqalnst a 8tandard sample. 
---.. - -- _ 
It b clear that through a Seed Certification Scheme government can largely - 
regulate seed distribution to farmers and provide consumer protection. *, 
legislation (i.e. legislation concerning the acceptance of varieties and -----. --- -- ___ __ _ -- .- - .- .. -- - - . I -. .-. . -- -.. 
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-the trade of s^eed) is not dependent on Plant Breeders' Rights legislation. 
In fact it would seem advisable to consider the introduction of the latter 
only after the former is running smoothly. 
Plant Breeders' Rights 
2.14. In most of the less developed countries plant treeding is carried out by 
government research organizations while in many developed countries with 
a market eonomy private industry has become involved as well. Furthem-? w- 
plant breeding is carried out by the international agricultural research 
centres (IARC's), supported by the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR)'. 
- -..__  
The work of the &e's collectively represents 
the largest rmltLnatioaa1 plant breeding effort ia the. puidb sector. 
2.15. Most countries'-having pri;;;lt;--sector-involvernent in plant breeding, seed 
production a&d its distribution have legislation regarding the acceptance 
. .-._ .- - ~ ,. --- - 
of v&ieties and the trade of seed. A number of those countries has on tom 
of that a special legislation providing some form of legal ownership to the 
originator of new plant varieties: Plant Breeders' Rights scheme ‘(phR.R.). 
'- .- - -- .----.-- _- ______ _ __,__ ., _ - _ -- - -.-.._ _ ._--_... ..----. -- -. .-- ___.__ 
2.16. Plant breeding and breeding research is very costly. The main objective of 
introducing a PBR scheme is in general to ena.ble originators of new genetic 
creations to have exclusive rights to their multiplication and sale'and thus 
to stimulate long-term investments in that field. In some countries public 
plant breeding institutes also take advantage of the P.B.R. scheme in order 
balance their budgets (e.g. INRA in France and PBI in the United Kingdom). 
Varietal protection is seen as a necessary condition to insure rewards to 
private or public plant breeders for their efforts. 
‘_ - 
-.. --- ----.-_ _. . 
2.17. Plant Breeders' Rights are granted according to provisions of national 
legislation. The sovereignity of the nations and their governments means 
that.the legislation is designed to 'etLe economical and social convenience 
of each country. It is a politicpl and economic decision for which national 
._-- -.. 
governments solely are responsible.. Since a %.R. &i&e is 'aXit&-pf 
national legislation, a right granted under such a scheme is only waLid.im 
: _ 
-‘lo - 
the country in which the title was issued. v 
_- . I __ 
patterns which the legal systems Of those ccw+-+-c ha-10 in common. Those . L w" A.W.1 
patterns can be found in the UPOV-convention. Nevertheless it is possible 
for a country to introduce a scheme which is no t compatible to the UPOV- 
convention, like for instance a scheme without a novelty requirement in 
1 
order to be able to apply the scheme to already existing and known varieties.- 
The UPOV-convention 
2.18. In 1961 some West-European states concluded a convention on Plant Breeders' 
Rights. The countries bound by the convention form the International Union 
for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV). In the convention are set 
out the minimum conditions which the national PBR szharues must meet. The aim 
of PBR is to stimulate investments in plant breeding and thereby to develop 
varieties which are superior to the original material in some identified A 
characters, i.e. varieties with higher yield, higher quality, greater _ .- .-.--_-._ -- .___- _ ------ -. _... _ _ - 
resistance to pests and diseases or, in other words, better adapted to 
man's needs. The ultimate aim is to improve agricultural production. The 
incentive is found in the granting of an exclusive right to the originator 
of a new plant variety. 
2.19. A Plant Breeders' Right can only cover a variety as such. In other words 
the right is granted with respec' L to a certain co-mbination of characteris- 
tics. Difference in one or more important characteristics leeds to a 
different variety and then to a new object for another Plant Breeders' Right. 
Unlike to what it is recognized in the industrial patent legislation, no 
particular characteristic (gene) or procedure for obtaining the final product 
can be protected by a Plant Breeders' Right. 
' 2.20, Trademark is a right which, in connection with a variety, can only protect 
its denomination not the variety as such. In a UpOV-country it is not allow- 
to have trade-mark-protection on the denomination of a variety which is or - 
has been protected by a Plant Breeders' Right. On the other hand, a breeder 
i 
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might try to prevent competitors from exploiting his variety through 
Trademark in non-UPOV countries. 
2.21. According to +he UPOV -convention a title of protection must be granted to ' 
the breeder of a variety, who has asked for varietal protection, when : 
a) - the variety is clearly distinguishable from other common known 
varieties; 
b) - the variety is sufficiently homogeneous; 
cl - the variety is stable; 
d) - the variety has not already been marketed; 
e) - the variety has been given a proper denomination. 
2.22. The rule mentioned under (a) is meant to avoid that titles will be issued 
with respect to varieties which hardly differ from each other. If distinct- 
ness is already necessary in identifying varieties for extension service and 
- seed certification purposes, this is all the more true in the case of granting 
I exclusive rights in relation to varieties. 
Where protection was granted for a variety which later on appears not to 
be distinct from a variety on which existence was co-n knowledge on the 
day of application for the right, the right nm;st be annulled. 
2.23, The condition that a variety must be homogeneous (b) means that a variety 
of which only "breeders' material" (e.g. F2 material in a self-pollinated 
species) exists, cannot be protected. Also the requirement +&at the 
variety must be stable (c), has that consequence. These conditions are 
also essential in defining the limits of the exclusive rights. 
2.24. The requirements relating to Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability 0XlS) 
are worked out for each crop separately. A major factor in this is the 
mode of reoroduction: cross-pol%inating,self-pollinating or vegetative - 
multiplication. It is sometimes suggested that stringent requirements for 
. especially uniformity are biologically illogical for cross-pollinating 
species while at the same time may delay the release of new varieties. 
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2.2s. 
2.26. 
2.27. 
2.28. 
2.29. 
Apointin this case is the registration of multilines which requires 
description and acceptance of the component lines individually. 
On the day of application for the right, the variety must not have been 
&keteC in the state of application or longer then 4 years in another state 
(A! : P ri++ Tfanted for a varjety which does not meet that condition must 
be annulled. 
The variety must be designated by a denomination (d) which must be free 
for anyone to use in relation to that variety. In principle the denomination 
should be the same in all UPOV-states and should always be used when propa- 
gating material of the variety is commercialized. 
The holder of a Plant Breeders' Right has the exclusive right 
- to produce for purpose of commercial marketing 
- to offer for sale - 
- to market 
the seed or 'other propagating material, as such, of the variety concerned 
properly identified by name. His exclusive position gives the holder of 
the right the possibility to gain some revenues in return for his 
achievement and capital investments. 
The right cannot cover the utilisation of the protected variety as an 
initial source of variation for the Dumose of creating other varieties or 
the commercialization of varieties created in this way unless repeated use 
of the variety is necessary for the commercial production of another 
variety (e.g. the use of a protected parental line to produce a hybrid). 
Also the production of propagating material for the use on own premises 
does not generally fall under the scope of the right. 
Finally ,it should be observed that the production and the marketing of seed 
(and other propagating material) for purposes other than to grow a crop - 
(e.g. seed of wheat for milling purposes, seed of barley for brewing purpc - 
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are not acts which are reserved to the holder of the right. 
nor reasons of eublic interest the free exercise of the right can be 
restrscted, @.a. bjl compulsory iiCenCeS. 
The duration of right shall be according to the UPOV-convention at least 
15 years. In fact that period is often longer: 20 to 25 years. 
2.30. Subject to some restrictions member-statesof UPOV must treat resident #and 
nationals of other member-states like their own nationals or residents. Z-2 
some UPOV-member-states breeders from non-Member-States can obtain P.R.B. as 
well. 
The plant breeder who wants to protect his variety in more than one count-q 
has to obtain protection in all those countries separately. There is no 
multinational or supra-national title of protection. 
The system of P.B.R. is a volunta,ry one. It is up to the breeder of a new 
variety to decide whether or cot he shall apply for protection. The 
application implies the disbursement of a certain amount of money by the 
applicant. 
Only the breeder (including the discoverer) of the variety or his successor 
in title can obtain protection. P.B.R. schemes contain provisions to assure 
that no other person unjustly obtains or keeps the right. 
Before the right is granted either the applicant or the granting authority 
(this depends on national legislation) has to prove that he or his prede- 
cessor in title has bred the variety. 
2.31. The right shall be annulled if, after granting of the title, the variety 
appears not to have fulfilled the requirements of distinction and novelty. 
If the breeder does not or not properly maintains the variety, the rights 
shall become forfeit. 
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P.P.R. administration in Western Europe 
7 73 T.a+s!a+ion on Plant Breeders' d Rights makes some administration activities 
necessary. These administra tive meastlres are to prevent that the system Ls 
misused. No rights can be granted without prior examination of the new 
variety on distinctness, homogeneity and stability (D.U.S.) and of the 
i--y-- - -c T-.c50~~.-c%T 4, 33tieD Ld* Y&b- nF.rmlf7, ca.na ~*~~Wli-Z?+i mp *"L.-r, A.- ""L-3 --.u w-a.-- ----- -. 
Examination on DUS standards in order to determine the identity of the 
variety is usually already present for extension service and certification - 
purposes. 
In most countries with a P.B.R. scheme a government authority examines 
the variety on DUS by means of growing tests in the field or in a glasshouse. 
In other states (e.g. USA) the rights are issued on the basis of examination 
performed by the breeder. For the purpose of this examination and of the 
examination of the remaining issues the competent authority may require 
the breeder to furnish all the necessary information, documents and 
propagating material. 
2.33. 
- 
It is understandable that the way in which the preliminary examinations are. 
carried out in the various countries vary considerably. To harmonize the 
variety testing the council of UPOV established some years ago several 
working parties who prepared for a number of crops guidelines,' containing 
the characteristics, which have'to be described, testing the varieties. 
It is very important for a proper working of the system to determine as far 
as possible the objectfor which rights are granted. This can be achieved 5: 
a combination of things. 
2.54. a. A full description on the basis of a list of agreed characteristics. 
b. A description of specific differences with other varieties of all 
characteristics, which can serve this purpose. 
c. To keep a stock of propagating material, which can be replenished when 
'necessary. The stock of this material gives the Authority the pssibtiit 
to ascertain later on, what the variety was at the time protection was - 
granted and to compare new varieties or suspected material - case of _ 
infringement - with the original variety. 
w 
2.35. Considerable -exp&tise .is-required-to test varieties, to make good botanical _ 
descriptions and to identify differences between varieties that satisfy 
legal requirements. Comparisons should preferably be made with a cclbection ..-_- ..__ -. 
of varieties already admitted gro& under different enviroamzstal C=sl&L'ikZS. -_ 
The USA-System 
2.36. In the USA, rights in relation to asexually reproduced varieties are grant,2 
under the Patent Act for a period of 50 years. This system is not further 
considered here. 
2.37. T'ne United States Plant Variety Protection Act - 1970, applicable to 
sexually reproduced varieties <Rollin, 1971)., fs in principle similar ::o 
the European P.B.R. schemes. Under that act rights can be granted to the 
breeder (including the discoverer) of a variety if that variety meets ,the 
. . 
- criteria regarding distinctness, uniformity, stability (DUS standards), 
- novelty and denomination. 
According to the US novelty'criterium, no right can be granted with respect 
to a variety if, more than one year before the date of application in the 
USA, 
- that variety was a public variety in the USA; the term "public variety" 
means a variety sold or used (excluding *the use for purposes of teszing! 
or exist& and pubiicly known; 
or 
- that variety was effectively available in the USA and adequately described 
by a publication reasonably deemed a part o f the public technical knowledge 
in the USA; the description must include a disclosure of the principal 
chara,cteristics by tinich the variety is distinguished; 
Or 
- an application for protection of the variety concerned, based on the same 
breeders' acts, was filed in a foreign country. 
The processing of applications in the USA is based on examination of infor- 
mation supplied by the originator of the new variety. The examination does 
.-.._ _ 
not necessarily include growing tests by government organization. 
-,. - ---i-. _ _ .-. 
) ..I‘ . : -. _:. _ 
2.38. 
2.39. 
2.40. 
The applicant of a Plant Variety Protection certificate has to fill up an 
1 
w 
Attachement A : Origin and breeding history of the variety, . __- 
Attachement B : Data relevant for determistitirsfi tif La nc~a~ty. 
Attachement C : Objective description of the variety. 
Pittamement 2, --- - : Additional description of the variety. 
At the same time the applicant must declare that he will deposit and replenish 
periodically viable samples of the variety in a public repository (Fort 
Collins). 
After the payment of a filing fee of $ 250,- and an examination fee of 
$ 250,-, the Plant Variety Protection Office compares +Ae description of the 
new variety to all known varietFes of the species. The office keeps up to 
date computer files of varietal descriptions based on standardized descrip- 
tion forms for,each crop. 
After a screening by computer, the examination on distinctness is completed 
by the examiner in order to establish whether the applicants' variety is - 
sufficiently distinct from the varieties which are, according to the compute- . * 
more or less similar or which are inadequately described in the computer fi- 
If necessary the applicant has to supply additional information in order to 
establish distinctness. 
Other System 
Apart from "exclusive rights" there are other systems to stimulate breeding i 
rewards. One of those is that of issuing “Inventor‘s Certificate" emp1oyed.L 
some countries with a centrally planned economy. III this system, the breeder 
receives from the government a form of recognition for a bred variety 
commensurate with its value to agriculture (f.i. judged by the acreage under 
production). 
Another system is, whereby the breeder of a variety is appointed the sole 
producer of basic seed supported by a Seed Certification Scheme which I 
stipulates that the production cycle stbrts with certified basic seed. &an, 
the breeder is rewarded by ticome derived from basic seed production. 
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I 2.41. If a breeder cannot obtain Plant Breeders' Rights in a country in which he 
wants to introduce his variety, he zuay be able to protect his interests by 
means of a civil law agreement or contract. In such a contract he may neaotiate 
I-O&~L~J~LS srsular to those under a licence agreement based on an exclusive 
. . rignt, f.i. through the condition that thelicencee will only deliver to the 
owner of the variety or shall not enter the variety in a specific market, etc. 
The owner of the variety mst however realize that : 
- contracts may be overruled by provisions in the law; 
- in the case the contract is not honoured, he has only a claim 
on the licencee, but in the absence of an "exclusive right" he 
cannot control or effect influence on how the variety is used by 
third parties. 
. 
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3.2. 
3.3. 
CHAPTER III - THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRES AND PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS 
" - 
,The role of IARC's in Plant Improvement 
3: \jLCcii LbLpaLLlllLc b” Giy&Li;l-L.k~ .&.a ; 
a) A large assorbcmeiit of plant varieties a&pted to 
different growing conditions. 
b) An objective appraisal and advice on the sui*&ility of 
new plant varieties under the different growing conditions. 
c) A rapid transfer of the products of plant breeding to farmers. 
Clearly these reqirements guide the activities of the International Centres 
and make close cooperation with national institutes an essential part of the 
total operation. A major problem is how to allocate tasks and responsibilitie 
In the Report of the Review Committee (CGIAR, September 1981, page 40-41) 
the following classification of research is adopted followed by some state- 
ments on the evolution of the CGIAR system. 
Quote W (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
basic .research - that designed to generate new - 
understanding (e.g. how the partitioning of assimilates - 
is influenced by plant height). 
strategic research - that designed for the solution of 
soecific rescarc*h problems (e.g. a technique for detecting 
dwarfing genes in wheat seedlings). 
aoplied research - that designed to create new technology 
(e.g. breeding new varieties of dwarf wheat that can 
respond to high levels of nitrogen without lodging). 
adaptive research - that designed to adjust technology 
to the specific needs of a particular set of environmental 
conditions (e.g. incorporating dwarf wheats into farming 
systems of the rainfed areas of the Pampean Region of 
Argentina). 
It is generally agreed that the original purpose of an International Centre 
was to generate new technology, i.e. to concentrate cm applied research. 
It is clear, however, that the generation of new technology requires an - 
adequate supply of the results of strategic research, which in turn draws _ 
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on the results 
If the correct 
technology, it 
of basic research. 
function of the international Cnhtres is to generate new 
follows that each developing country must at least develoip 
3 
: . . _ &C3 Giiil capacity fo;- _ 3--;.;-,- 0-p L-Lb L rssczrc!: . It also follows *at institutes . a. 
other than the Centres themselves must supply the results of strategic 
and basic research. The place of regional research institutions, such as 
CATIE or ACSAD, in this model would be to substitute for weak national -. 
programmes by undertaking adaptive research for a whole region, and to 
..- 
reinforce national prcqrammes by supplying new technology, not provided 
by the Centres. 
I 
- 
A broad view of the evolu&n of the CGIAR Syst&m suggests that even if 
this were the original concept of the function of a- Centre, it soon b&me 
deflected in two ways. First, in order to achieve success, Centres felt 
obliged to apply some of their resources to adaptive research either 
because of inadequate national capabilities, or because they could not 
make effective use of regional organizations. Second, owing to the lack 
of appropriate results from strategic research, Centres expanded, to a 
greater or-lesser extent, their research capacities for tackling more ' 
basic problems. These competing tendencies have implications both for 
the management of the System and its place in the world pattern." Unquote 
3.4. For the present discussion the main issue is how far down the path of 
variety development IARC's are involved. If the suggestion is accepted 
that the main objectives of the IARC's are in "applied research",for ,o:ant 
breeding this could'be interpreted as collection and screening of genetic 
material, creation of base-populations for selection programmes and se:Lection 
and breeding programmes up to variety development. There is however a growing 
contention that the final steps leading to varieties should be done in natio- 
nal programmes and the IARC's should gradually shift emphasis of their 
research upwards to include both strategic and applied research. 
3.5. Hence ultimately IARC's will primarily release base-populations for further 
breeding on which P.B.R. are not applicable. Whether it wants or should 
continue its present very liberal attitude in making breeding material 
available essentially on request is a decision to be taken by the various 
1 20 - 
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Centres Boards or the CGIAR. Howeve r the present situation is that B 
many national breeding programmes are still to weak to accept responsi- 
-Plant Breeders' Rights on varieties based cn Centros' material 
3.6. The CGIAR network of agricultural research centres is primarily directed 
at the major food crops (cereals, grain legumes, pulses) and a few fodder 
crops. In the following discussion no differentiation is made according 
to the mode of reproduction (self-pollinating, cross-pollinating, 
vegetative) unless specifically mentioned. 
3.7. The primary objective of the IARC's is to have farmers supplied with better 
varieties. There are sofar no or little restrictions on the distribution 
. 
and use of IARC genetic materials neither do IARC's claim any legal ownership 
of such materials. 
The present organization 0 f breeding and testing programmes of the LARC's - 
are focussod tctaliy on cooperation with national institutes in developing 
countries. Involvement of private companies in developing countries is 
considered a national responsibility. The use of IARC materials by private 
indust,ry in developed countries is recognized. There are even already 
examples where IARC material with only minor further selection were 
submitted for PBR protection in some countries. This however has caused 
no serious 
restricted 
3.8. However it would seem germain to examine in some detail what possible 
concern within the IARC's as the consequences of this were 
to some developed countries. 
effects the existence of PBR legislation in target countries could have 
on genetic materials released by the IARC's. 
Although different kinds of Plant Breeders' Rights legislation can be 
visualised, the discussion only takes into account systems compatible to 
the UPOV convention. 
- 
A number of situations can be distinguished : 
- 
-. 
3.9. a. The material represents 
or marketed already. In 
who is not the Centre's 
b. 
- 
C. 
d. 
a finished variety and is not offered for sale 
a country with a P.B.R. scheme a third person, 
successor in trtle with regard to the breed.Ls+ 
work, can in principle not obtain varietal protection since he cannot 
be considered as the originator, breeder or discoverer of the variety. 
.In -some countries the breeder has to prove that he really bred the 
variety himself. In the USA this is effected by the required "history 
of the breeding work". In other countries the burden of proof might rszt 
with the authorities. 
The material represents a finished variety and is already offered for 
sale or marketed in the country in which P.%.R. is applied for, or longer 
than 4 years in another country. By the lack of novelty no Plwt 
Breeders' Right can be granted with regard to that variety. 
N.B. According to &e USA scheme the variety CM have been offered 
for sale or marketed in the USA during one year previous to 
the application without destroying the novelty. 
The material represented is rather uniform and stable but just insuffi- 
cient in the sense of P.B.R. legislation, No rights can be granted Witi 
respect to such material. 
The material represents a heterogeneous (and instable) collection of 
plants (e.g. a population). IA that case it is certainly not a variety 
which can be protected by P.B.R. 
3.10. Finished varieties of the Cantres as mentioned under a) and b) may be 
used by third persons'to create other varieties (by crossings), Those 
other varieties might be protected by their originators. ft is of no 
importance if the Centres' varieties from which they descend are 
commonly known, marketed or protected. Of course the new varieties must 
be distinct by one or more important characteristics from all common 
L known varieties including those from the Centres. 
.* 3-11. Also the Centres’ material, which does not represent a protectable variety, 
(situations c) and d)) can be used by others to create protectable varieties 
(by selection). Those varieties can be protected by their originators or 
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selectors as well. 1 
The protection, which is only valid in those countries where it has been 
m 
granted, does not cover the material of the Centre as such. It may happen 
that &?= br~eaers c-o- + ,,,G.,e two varieties from one batch of I'centres' material" 
Roth varieties are in principle protectable. 
3 .:2. 3 I -*i-y m=+n+-ial developed bv a Centre the. breeder cf a protccte2 varie2y --- - --w*- 4 
is rewarded for breeding activities for which public funds were used. This 
is inevitable. On the other hand that way the results of research are made 
available to agriculture rapidly. It sbould'also be realised that making of 
the crossings is only a part 0 f the costs involved in producing and intro- 
ducing a new variety. 
The Centres and P.B.R. 
3-13. A government of a developing country which through its national programme 
closely cooperates with one or more international centres, may at some 
stage decide to introduce a system of P.B.R. The primary objective would - 
most likely be a felt need to stimulate private investment in plant .- 
breeding. P.B.R. could also be used to protect government varieties 
developed with public funds in order to provide financial support to 
public institutes. 
3.14. The introduction of a P.B.R. scheme as well as the policy whether or not to 
protect varieties developed with public funds are national decisions. Rele- 
vant to them is the following. In seeking for protection for its own 
varieties a government may delay their introduction. On the other side 
the government would be able to offer a certain preferential position to 
a private company. In that way the production and distribution of seed of 
government bred varieties by private industry can be stimulated and support 
Of course such a system must not get detrimental to the aim to furnish the 
fanners, on reasonable terms, seed or other propagating material of good 
gtrality of the adapt&d varieties. 
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3.15. The' IARC's were established to give research support to agricultural 
development in the Third World. In plant breeding this has meant support 
(in the fcrm of varieties and breeding mteria1) t.n national government 
organizations since the private industry in plant breeding is still either 
absent or of minor importance in those countries. 
3.16. k relevant question is whether IARC's shcu1.C koop a claim of ownership of 
material released to national research'organisations or whether with the 
release, ownership is tacitly transferred to the receiving organisation. 
Considering present practice and source of CGIAR funds, it would seem logical 
to consider national government research organLutior.s LI developing 
countries as the successors in title to the material released to them 1)~ the 
IARC'S. 
3.17.. It might be argued that the IARC's in principle should obtain varietal 
protection just to raise funds. Theoretically this would of course be 
possible. However P.B.R. only applies to varieties that satisfy stringent DUS 
standards, hence finished products rather than breeding populations. Even . 
most of the present IARC's varieties probably do not satisfy these standards, 
let alone the great bulk of breeding populations made available. Besides 
usually in most UPOV countries rules stipulate that non-residents can only 
apply for D.B.R. by enlisting the services of a national, a resident or a 
national organisation. 
3.18. Quite often material is released from which still various varieties 
can be selected which satisfy distinctness criteria of the UPOV convention. 
It should be noted that to satisfy standards of homogeneity and stability 
would considerably increase the work of the IARC's in an area which is 
considered the responsibility of national organisations (variety development1 
and delay the release of material. 
3.19. The )'novelty" requirement would create further problems. Material should 
not be offered for sale or marketed prior to the application for the 
protection in the country of application. The offering for sale or 
marketing in other countries will alsb damage the "novelty“ of a 
variety if taking place longer than 4 years prior to application. 
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3'.2O. The unavoidable conclusion is that present T.B.R. legislation is really m 
designed to protect ownership of finished varieties. If IARC’s want t0 
benefit from this protection in full, they would have to be transformed 
into plant breeding organisations that release finished varieties. Breeding 
populations would only be released on the basis of formal agreements 
reguiating ownership of varieties developed by the recipient of such 
materials. 
The IARC's would be able to collect considerable royalties from their 
material. However such an approach would clearly mean a total turning 
around of the objectives of the CGIAR system which would seem unacceptable 
to most donors and developing country governments. Hence it does not 
constitute a realistic alternative. _ . 
3.21. Another reason for a Centre to ask for varietal protection is to prevent 
others from taking undue advantage of the work of the IARC's. It must be 
clear that the development of a new variety from breeding populations of 
IARC's by others can result in $rote,ctable varieties. 
- 
. - 
If the breeding work of a Centre does represent a variety or a nearly 
finished variety, it is legally spoken impossible for a third person, 
not being the. Centres successor in title to obtain rights for that 
variety because he is not the breeder of the variety. 
3.22. IARCs material in later stages of development (i.e. when it starts becoming 
recognizable as a variety) could be distributed to some authorities in UPOV 
countries for storage. In case a variety is suspected to originate from Suck 
IARC material, the stored seed can be used as reference material to 
investigate the claim. The possibility of doing this.might work as a seriou: .- _ _ _ __ 
detterent to improper use of IARC's varieties. 
3.23. Apart from what, legally spoken, cannot be protected the question remains 
uhat should not be protected. _ 
It might be possible for IARC's to enter into agreements with recipients 
of Centre's material that they will not apply for protection of varieties - 
derived from such materials. It should however be realised that agreements- 
exist only between parties concerned and' that these cannot be binding for 
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others. Hence if a third party obtains the variety the agreement has no ' 
value with regard to the issue of absolute rights. 
Instead of a‘contractual arrangement, a possible solution might be a code 
of ethics among-breeders organized in Assinsei. iXle shoulii however noi 
forget that membership of Assinse 1 is voluntary and that such a code of 
ethics can never be enforced.. 
3.24. If a Centre wants to keep (s&J control over breeding material it has 
distributed in a country that does not have P.B.R. or on material that is 
not elegible for protection, it can enter into a civil law agreement with 
the recipients. Through contractual arrangement the Centers can negotiate 
revenues on their genetic materials or"try to achieve that without their 
consent no private rights will be issued, neither on the material itself 
nor on varieties derived from it. 
- 
- 
Of course it should be realised that few private breeders will spend effort 
and money on breeding if there is no possibility of obtaining some revenue 
if he is successful. In fact it is quite possible that even the introduction 
of finished IARC varieties by private industq requires 'some form of 
varietal protection (This may be notably the case with vegetatively repro- 
duced crops such as potatoes). . 
. ..-.--- .-___._ _---.- ----.- - _____._ .-.-- ..- -. 
--By allowing varietal Protection to third parties on varieties derived from 
IARC's material it may be possible to cover part of the development costs or 
give the IARC title to part of the revenues, 
In case it concerns a finished IARC variety, it will be necessary that 
the third party concerned is appointed successor in title to the vari.ety 
With respect to P.B.R. 
P.B.R. in developing countries 
3.25. me introduction of P.B.R. is, as has been stated before, the national 
responsibility of the country concerned. 
Before introducing P.B.R., a careful study s'>ould be made of the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of such legislation, notably the effect it 
may have on the agricultural production system (i.e. the farming cormnunity). 
This of course applies to all countries. 
Common reasons for the introduction of P.B.R. are : 
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1. - Stimulation of private plant breeding in the country itself, - 
although also public financed institutions can benefit from 
Bucfi iegislation. 
2. - Ease of introducing varieties bred in other countries that have 
P.B.R. legislation. Tnis may bespecially important if a country 
is suitable for seed production. Breeders are in general rel-uctant 
to multiply protected varieties in a country that does not recog- 
nize proprietary rights. 
3. - In general it is considered reasonable that a breeder is rewarded 
for a variety commensurate to its use. (Compatible to patents, 
copy rights and trademarks) 
4. - Absence of P.B.R. may stimulate breeding for varieties that have an 
in-built protection, such as‘ Fl-hybrids. The price of seed can be 
adjusted to include a breeders reward. Only the holder of the 
parental iines can produce seed of the variety and the farmer is 
probably prepared to pay the price if he is confident that he will, 
be compensated byhigheryields (This of course assumes that the - 
farmer has the necessary credit which may not always be the case. 
not,a situation will develop whereby only the more affluent will be 
able to utilize the better varieties). An obvious disadvantage of 
hybrid varieties is the need for farmers to buy new seeds every 
growing season. Furthermore it requires an efficient seed productic 
and distribution system, lacking in many developing countries. -. -.- ._ _ _ - 
Countries in Europe that have introduced P.E.R. generally observed an increas 
in private investment in plant breeding. Furthermore, according tc Murphy 
(1980) and Silvey (19781, there is a positive correlation between the rate- 
of introduction of new varieties and yield increases. It is of course 
difficult to separate yield increases resulting from new varieties from 
yield increases caused by improved production methods. 
Besides, .a point of issue is not whether plant breeding can contribute to 
increased agricultural production (for which there is substantial evidence) 
but if and when private 
supported institutions. 
industry does so more sucessfulfy than public - 
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Godden and Powell(1981) suggested..models for a cost/benefit analysis of the 
effects of P.B.R. applicable to the Australian situation where P.B.R. is 
under discussion. 
3.26. In at least Argentina, Brasil, Chili, Kenya and-Mexico a P.B.R. scheme is 
under consideration, is in the procose of being introduced or has been 
introduced. 
The question has to be faced if and when legal measures should be taken to 
stimulate private piant breeding in developing countries. In virtually 
all developing countries, plant breeding is still primarily the responsi- 
bility of national government research organizations. In most countries 
the same still applies as well for seed production and distribution. 
- 
If there is interest of private industry to enter the field of plant 
breeding, this is generally only for the major crops or crops that can 
command a high seed price (some vegetable crops). 
- Bence parallel to private industry, government organisations will always 
have to be maintained as well. 
3.27. A system of P.B.R. legislation assumes the existence of : _...- --- 
a. a system tc evaluate new varieties; 
5. a seed production and distribution system; 
c. a technical and administratnve body to support and control the 
systems, mentioned under (a) and (b); 
d. a legislation regulating the admittance of varieties and the seed 
production/distribution (at least when the private sector is involved). 
3.28. A iogical first step in developing countries would seem to involve private 
industry and/or farmers ,organisations/co-operatives in seed production and 
distribution. It is the general experience that such organisations tend to 
be more efficient in this field than government organisations (research, 
extension or others). 
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seed production and distribution can be largely regulated by the government 
through an aooronriate Seea Cer+i /iq~+i.-y _Cr-\.::c=. T:;i: z>.;;;.l jia<;ti;f 
ofiiciai testing of varieties in representative areas leading *up to lists 
of recommended varieties (also needed for extension services). Recommended 
varieties can be muitipiied by non-government institutions on a contract 
basis. 
A system of this nature would seem to be largely compatible with the present 
procedure followed by IARC's in releasing genetic materials to national 
organisations in develcping countries. . . . . . - 
3.29. P.B.R.-legislation is in this process a further refinement with the primary 
objective of stimulating the private sector in the country concerned to 
invest in plant breeding. 
Ass&ng that the system regarding the admittance of varieties and the 
seed control systems are working, the introduction of P.B.R. needs only 
little more technical and administrative organization, since P.B,R. is - 
just an additional component on those schemes. . 
As a rule the infrastructure and recuirements in develooinc countries are -- 
still such that PBR in the sense of the UpCV convention can at oresent 
serve no Useful purpose over and above what can be achieved wi+& seed 
legislation and certification schemes. 
Lona-term views on the work of the IARC's andtheir relationshius 
to other public and private organisations at the national and 
'international level 
3.30. In 3.3. the main objectives of the IARC's are summarized by quoting 
the Report of the Review Committee of the CGIAR (Sept. '81) and the 
consequences these views have on plant breeding. __ .:- .-_-_- -__ 
Research at the IARC's is financed from public funds to provide research 
support to research and development activities in developing countries. 
The automatic partners are governmen t institutions but there is nothing - 
in the regulations to prevent close cooperation with suitable private 
organisations. The very liberal policy with respect to the distribution 
of plant material would seem to have facilitated wide distribution and 
use and as such has considerable merit. _ . ._. __.. - 
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The &ii2 purpose is that farmers are 
whether this is done through private 
IL 
- 
3.31. 
, 
supplied with better varieties and 
or public institutions would seem 
to be of limited concern to the CGIAR; 
The issue here is that such a policy does not result in restrictions in 
the use of the material through undeserved property rights. The IARC's 
have to provide support to countries which differ widely in development, 
Some countries have adequate national breeding operations in progress 
(often public but in some 'instances also private) and look to the IARc's' 
basically for new genetic materials and to plug into international testing 
programmes. Other countries are totally dependent on the IARC's for 
varieties since they lack breeding programs that have sufficient strength. 
.-.- ..-._ _ ..~ -. 
IARC's perform a major function in training and institution building. 
National capacity for variety development will increase. In the inter& 
period, which is going to last still many years, IARC breeding programs 
will have to cover the full range of strategic research through applied 
research to at least assistance in adaptive research. For basic research, 
the systems will continue to rely on specialised institutes outside the 
system. 
Hence, for the present discussion, it 
continue to release genetic mzteriaP.5 
to finished varieties, specific lines 
etc., etc. for many.years to come. 
is imperative that IARC's will 
ranging from breeding populations 
harbouring individual characteristics 
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CHAPTER IV - SOME ISSUES RELATED TO IARC's AND P.B.R. 
How does development of national programmes and plant breeding 
4.1. In most developed countries, private and public breeding research 
complement each other. It is likely that national programs will 
Intreasinolv take over responsibilities for varietal development frcm - d 
LARC's. This means that the work of'the IARC will gradually shift emphasis 
upstream to include mainly applied and strategic researdh. A number of 
plant breeding activities would seem to benefit permanently from an 
international approach, notably establishment and study of genetic 
collections (Gene banks), testing materials under wide ranging environ- 
mental conditions etc. It is expected that in this sphere there will be 
continuous need for an international organisation such as the CGIAR, even 
if in time the need for actual variety development may become questionable. - _ - ---. _. -- ._-.--. -_-_. . - . 
What would be the effects of the wide introduction of P.B.R. legislatior 
- 
on research programs in the various crops worked upon by the IARC's - 
4.2. (Differentiation should be made between self-pollinating crops, cross- 
pollinating crops and crops reproduced vegetatively. Also the products 
of breeding would seem to be an factor, such as hybrid populations, composit 
varieties, multilines and others, the release of finished varieties or of 
segregating populations) 
P.B.R. can be applied to all kinds of varieties of all species as long as 
they satisfy the DUS standards. The criteria for evaluating these sandards 
are set by the national authorities. However cleariy some kinds of repro- 
duction (cross-pollinating) and some types of varieties (multilines) can 
create difficulties as far as homogeneity and stability are concerned. F-i. 
France does not protect cross-pollinating varieties, the Netherlands do 
not protect multilines but only the component lines individually. 
'4.3. According to the-prfnc;tPles df‘UPOV, no third person not being the successor F. 
in title of the Centre, can obtain P.B.F. on a fbished variety developed 
- 
by the Centre. 
- 
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For this the Centre does not have to apply for P-B-R.-protection. However 
control would be facilitated if some P.B.R. granting authorities were 
informed of the variety. 
".. 
Kence whether Centres should themselves apply for, P-Z-R.-protecticn w0c.18 
seem to be mainly determined by financial reasons. Hence, independent of 
applying for P-B-R.-protection, finished varieties are reasonably well 
protected against pirating. 
This is less the case for segregating populations. Again according to the 
principles of UPOV, a third party can obtain P.B.R. on varieties which 
have been developed from secregatxng materials of the Centres. 
If the Centres want to prevent that from happening, they seem to have a 
choice between : 
a) -to combine the release of segregatirqmaterials with sivil law 
agreements regulating their use,.* necessa?y supported by a 
"code of ethics" among recipients (Assinsel-sode) 
b) - to develop only finished varieties. 
Should the IARC's release segregating material ra'ther than finished - 
varieties and should they work on hybrids, composites and populations, 
multilines 
4.4. The primary objective of IARC's is to provide supportive research, i.e. 
breeding populations and other base materials for varietal development. 
However for the time being many countries still lack adequate research 
fO?I even varietal development, which means that IARC's also must release 
finished varieties for those conditions. 
_.. 
4.5. Essentially IARC's should work on whatever varieties or material seems the 
most appropriate, with a bias towards small farmers needs. An important 
consideration also is the available capabilities for seed production. It 
is on the basis of this that work on hybrids is questionable since succh 
material cannot be multiplied by the farmers themselves and create 
dependance on an outside supply organisation. 
. 
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4.6. If a Centre wants to start developing hybrid varieties, f.i. in view of m 
yieid potential, the following factors should be considered. 
- Is -cne iiiAfras+~-ticture aiid f inaiixial situation cf +-he target region- 
adequate for conttiuous seed supply: 
- Are there guarantees that parental lines are properly maintained 
and seed production and distribution is functiontig adequately. 
4.7. The answer of ownership of varieties or near-varieties has been discussed. 
What would be the effect of P.B.R. on the exchange of breeding material 
_ -- 
4.8. P.B.R. does not prevent the use of any protected variety for the purpose 
of further breeding (through crossing). I- -.. . . .- - 
Breeding populations and potential varieties developed from them cannot be 
protected. Hence it is unlikely that private breeders will release 
breeding material which is being used for varietal development to others, 
including the IARC's. Private plant breeding i- 3 a very competitive business. 
(In fact many government breeding organisations involved 'in variety 
development are equally jealous of their breeding material). For these reaso' 
it is not realistic to assume that private breeding organisation will recipr 
cate a liberal release of breeding materials from the IARC's. 
The reason however is not P,BJL, per&, but a characteristic of private b.re 
institutions having to survive in a competitive world. On the o^Lher hand, if 
PBR has stimulated the development of a vigorous private industry, breeding 
material released by IARC's may be worked on more extensively with the chant 
of better varieties. 2 
-- 
y See also Addendum. I - 
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Wnat would be the effect of P.B.R. to the legal aspects of IARC 
mandates, constitutions, agreements with co-operating countries 
and staff employment 
4 .3-. As long as there is a need for basic genetic research and practical breeding 
work by the IARC's for the development of agriculture, the IARC mandates 
should not be influenced by P,B.R..legislation‘. only in case a P.B.R. scheme 
which is a matter of national legislation - would interfere with the diffusion 
of their results, the Centres should come to an agreement with the co- 
operating countries in order to guarantee an optimal effect of their work. 
Employees of the Centres should not be entitled to exclusive rights on 
creations resulting from their employment. 
What would be the effect on the support of the IARC's if they decide 
to register and protect (either with or without claiming royalties) 
their breeding results 
4.10. This question is only relevant for finished varieties. If the varieties . 
concerned are the results of a co-operation between a Centre and national 
programs, the decision-about registration and-protection should be made 
jointly. 
Applying for registration and protection in the various countries as well 
as the management of it means extra work and administration and consequently 
extra staff. 
Possible revenues through royalties are likely to be deducted from the 
financial support of the donor countries. The licence shall pass on the 
royalties charged to his customers. Among them could be developing countries ! 
Registration and protection without claiming royalties only to prevent 
others from getting exclusive rights on the varieties concerned is a very 
cumbersome method. To achieve protection it would be sufficient to inform 
-.---. 
(some of) the countries where'.P;B.R. schemes-&gist about the existence of- 
varieties, 
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4.11. 
What would be the likelihood of IARC and network materials being 
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In the P.B.R. schemes compatible with the UPOV principles, rights can be 
grantee? with respect to varietieg which originate from existing materiai 
as long as they are clearly distjnguishable from existing varieties. An 
application for protection on a v%riety which is not or not sufficiently 
distinct from an existing variety--must fail, legally spoken, i.n P.B.R. 
schemes compatible to the UPOV principles. In the connection it deserves 
consideration to keep P.B.R. granting cbuntries.informed about breeding 
the IARC's. 
What would be the implications for developing countries if they do 
not enact P.B.R. legislation Fn terms of .access to improved 
varieties of potential value to their agriculture 
Of 
4.12. Presence or, absence of P.B.R, has of course.. no effect on movement of breeding- 
materials from IARC's or government institutions. - 
Privat breeders from abroad are often reluctant to send their varieties for 
(official) testing if there is no protection of ownership. This explains 
why commercial plant breeding have a general interest in the breeding of 
hybrids which have an inbuilt protection (can only be multiplied by the 
holder of the parent lines). 
How serious the absence of P.B.R. effects the availability of suitable 
varieties from the commercial sector is difficult to judge. After all, 
the choice under these circumstances is between trade tiith no protection 
and no trade at all. 
What would be the implioations for developing countries of enacting 
P.B.R. legislation. ._ II 
4.13. In our opinion P.B.R. legisstion is the last component in the structure Of 
breeding varieties and prodtiing and distributing seed. When that structure 
is firm and when there is a need to stimulate local (private) breeding one - 
could consider to introduce?P.B.R, s&eme on top of other variety and seed - --- 
schemes. 
._ --- .---- _.--- -__ __ -- -. .- .- - ---- -..- -. . ____ 
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‘4.14. Introduction of PBR might have the following implications for the country in 
questbion : 
- it must have 
to recognize 
- it must have 
seed; 
a system incluaing a tec.hnical ol?d &miniatratft; L-;i-. ww 2 
and evaluate varieties; 
a system to control the production and distribution of 
--. 
- it may attract local seed production of foreign varieties; 
- it may stimulate seed production and distribution by private 
enterprises; 
- it may lead to (more) seed production for export propagating operations 
of which the seed is re-exported; 
Private industry participation might lead to more competition and 
result in improved availability of good seed at reasonable prices; 
- introduction of a scheme compatible to the UPUV principles would 
enable. UPOV membership; such membership results in national or reci- 
,procal treatment of its nationals by other Member-States; 
- recognition and evaluation procedures might slow down the introduction 
. of varieties, also those developed in co-operation with the Centres; 
- the existence of a PBR scheme in a developing country would force the 
IARC's and the co-operating national institutes to decide whether or 
not to apply rights on their varieties; possible revenues through 
royalties on those varieties might replace finencial suppost: of the 
breeding work for the developing world from donor countries; 
- incorrect implementation of exclusive rights in the developing country in 
question (such as poor availability, high royalties) could effect the co- 
operation between the IARC's and the national breeding program Of that 
country. _ 1/ 
Y See afso Addendum. 
CHAPTER V - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
L. 
.b. 
C. 
a. 
. balanced system. 
e. A Plant Breeders' Right is a nationally limited right. 
f. 
h. 
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distrdxtim is of importance to agriculture. 
As long as breeding of varieties as well as seed production and 
distribution is in the hands of the government there iS little 
need for legislption. There still need to be a separate mechanism 
for testing and assurance and enforcements of qualitij control 
standards. 
P.B.R. aims at stimulating long-term investments by private plant breeder: 
As a rule the infrastructure in developing countries is such that legis- 
lation on plant breeding as is applied in UPOV countries can serve no 
useful purpose. Plant Breeders' Rights should rather be regarded as an 
additional and finishing touch to an already smoothly running seed 
production and distribution program. 
The introduction of PBR is a national decision. The scheme can be ajusted - 
to national needs. The UPOV convention gives the guidelines for an even1 - 
A Plant Breeders' Right compatible to the UPOV convention re,lates.to a 
plant variety as such, SO to a specific combination of characteristics, 
not to individual characteristics which may be embedded in the variety. 
According to the UPOV convention the legal right covers the production 
for purpose of commercial marketing, the offering for sale and the 
marketing of propagating material as such. 
It does not cover the production of propagating material for the use 
Of one's own premises nor the use of that material in creating another 
variety, except when the repeated use of the protecting variety is 
necessary for the commercial production of that other variety. 
The =fn difference between the P.B.R,-system in the USA and Western Eur 
is that, while in Western Europe the authorities themselves establish 
the report and the description of the variety by tests, in the USA the _ 
breeder has to establish the descriptfon of the variety.- 
1. Many developing countries will have to pay more attention to the develop- 
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mont of production and distribution programs, YO that the activities 
the Centres in the field of development of new varieties can benefit 
farmers in de developing countries more rapidly. 
Additional funds should be created for development of such nationai 
programs. 
- 
Ub 
ihe 
We suggest that plant.breeding activities at the IARC's should be mair.;y 
directed to more multi-disciplinary plant breeding and that in general 
the finalisation of the varieties should be left to the national insti- 
tutes. 
Tne policy for the co-operation between the Centres and government plant 
breeding institutes in developed countries that have a PBR legislation 
should guarantee a free exchange of breeding material. It should prevent 
private firms from making applications for Plant Breeders' Rights for 
varieties that have been developed by the Centres. As a rule however 
selections from populations bred by the centres in the present system 
are illegible for Plant Breeders' Rights. 
The Centres are dissuaded from applying for Plant Breeders' Rights for 
varieties they have developed themselves, because it requires time- 
consuming additional work for selection and administration, while the 
maintenance of the varieties that are on +che plant breeders' list 
requires contineous attention. 
In order to prevent unjustified granting of Plant Breeders' Rigths to 
finaiised varieties of the Centres, sufficient publicity about these 
varieties should be given e.g. tinrough publications or by'furnishinq 
(some of) the PBR authorities material and/or descriptions of those 
varieties. 
I’ , 
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ANNEX1 
LIST OF ISSUES FOR THE CONSIDEMTION OF THE 
TAC CONSULTANTS ON PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS 
1 AD V?at are the likely effects of extension on plant breeders? 
rights legislation in developing countries on genetic resources, in 
particular on: 
(i) the rate and extent of genetic erosion in field crop and 
pasture plants; 
(ii) access by IARCs and developing countries to these resources 
as private genetic resources collections expand; _ 
. 
(iii) the problems of securing financial support for the IARC 
collections as comparable private collections are built 
'up; 
(iv> the readiness/unwillingness of developing countries to 
allow expropriation of their endemic genetic resources; 
(VI policies for collection and release of genetic resources 
from URC collections. 
2. What would be the differential effects of the spread of PBR 
legislation on the research programmes on the various plants worked 
on by the IARCs, such as self and cross pollinated crops, vegetatively 
propagated crops, hybrid materials, composites, multilines, pasture 
plants, etc., in particular on: 
(3 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv> 
(VI 
(vi> 
the need for breeding programmes in the IARCs as large 
international companies increasingly breed for major 
crops of interest to developing countries; 
breeding strategies at the IARCs, such as release of 
segregating materials rather than finished varieties 
for national selections, and work on hybrids, composites 
and populations, multilines, etc.; 
the interchange of breeding materials; 
the operation of networks in partnership with developing 
countries; 
the legal aspects of IARC mandates, constitutions, agreements 
with cooperating countries, and research staff employment; 
the support for the IARCs if they decide to register (but 
not claim royalties) on their releases, both among donors 
and among developing countries who may disinterpret their 
motives; 
Annex I - page 2 
(vii) the likelihood of IARC and network materials being commercially 
patented if the Centres do not register them; 
(viii) the long-term impact and role of the IARCs, especially in 
- L. -..1- - I~LcL;;"LI L" U‘kCWVLh~, ,zz LT.. i,5 I-,;:c,r,ct ~;t-;~-~& L,yz,-'ic- -,A b ---- 
more basic genetic research; 
(ix) the more complex socio-economic effects and impact of their 
work, including the development of input packages associated 
with patented varieties of IARC origin. 
3. What would be the implications for developing countries: 
(9 of not enacting PBR legislation, in terms of access to improved 
varieties of crops adapted to local conditions; 
(ii) of enacting the various types of PBR legislation on: 
(a> compatibility with PBR in most important source countries; 
(b) implications for national testing and advice procedures; 
(c) local seed production; 
Cd) availability and price of appropriate/adapted varieties; 
(e> relations and cooperation with IARCs. 
N.B. When reviewing this list TAC noted that the issues related to 
genetic resources had already been addressed by the IBPGR 
consultant on PBR. The Committee underlined also that the 
adoption or not of PBR legislation by developing countries 
was a matter for these countries to decide. The TAC study 
would therefore be focussed mainly on those aspects which 
have implications for the relations and cooperation of IARCs 
and developing countries. 
ADDENDIM 
To be added: 
Page 10, para 2.17: 
PBR legislation needs to be flexible in order to be able to 
adapt itself to new developments in plant breeding and seed 
.production. 
Application for PBR is voluntary. PBR need not be adopted for 
all crop species. Some species or varieties may not lend 
themselves to satisfy basic criteria essential in granting 
rights (e.g. uniformity). There may be situations where PBR 
offer no advantage. 
Page 32, para 4.8: 
A major achievement of the IARCs is the system of international- 
multi-locational testing of breeding materials in various 
stages of development, including both Centres' material and 
mate-rials from. national programmes. All participants have 
access to all materials providing for a system of free exchange 
of breeding materials. This system does not seem compatible 
with practices, perhaps even with the interests of private 
companies. Hence PBR and the expansion of private industry 
involvement in plant breeding in developing countries may 
effect the input into the testing-exchange scheme of the national 
cooperators. 
Page 35, para 4.14: ' 
It will primarily stimulate private plant breeding in 
commercially attractive crops. 
In situations where the national capability in plant breeding 
is still weak, PBR may attract foreign companies which through 
size and expertise can assume dominance in national seed 
production. 
